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Pathogens represent a significant threat to human health leading to the
emergence of strategies designed to help manage their negative impact.
We examined how spiritual beliefs developed to explain and predict the
devastating effects of pathogens and spread of infectious disease. Analysis
of existing data in studies 1 and 2 suggests that moral vitalism (beliefs about
spiritual forces of evil) is higher in geographical regions characterized by
historical higher levels of pathogens. Furthermore, drawing on a sample
© 2019 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
of 3140 participants from 28 countries in study 3, we
found that historical higher levels of pathogens were
associated with stronger endorsement of moral vitalis-
tic beliefs. Furthermore, endorsement of moral vitalistic
beliefs statistically mediated the previously reported
relationship between pathogen prevalence and conser-
vative ideologies, suggesting these beliefs reinforce
behavioural strategies which function to prevent infection.
We conclude that moral vitalism may be adaptive: by
emphasizing concerns over contagion, it provided an
explanatory model that enabled human groups to reduce
rates of contagious disease.
1. Introduction
Throughout human history, pathogens have posed a persistent
threat to the survival and growth of humans. To mitigate this
threat, humans may have developed a suite of psychological
responses known as a ‘behavioural immune system’ that pro-
tects against the spread of infectious disease (e.g. [1–8]). While
prior work has assumeddetectionmechanisms capable of iden-
tifyingpathogen threats andactivating the behavioural immune
system (e.g. [8]), human threat detection is enhanced in the
presence of a theory (lay or scientific) on which to base predic-
tion and response. Here, we propose that ‘moral vitalism’
beliefs—beliefs in contagious and agentic spiritual forces of
evil—provided a lay theoretic model of the origin and spread
of disease among pre-germ-theory societies. Furthermore, we
suggest that moral vitalism is associated with key elements
of the behavioural immune system, reinforcing avoidance of
pathogen cues in the immediate environment and bolstering
adherence to traditional norms and ethnocentrism.Moral vital-
ism may have emerged as humans tried to explain the spread
of disease and persisted because it conferred an adaptive
advantage to groups who were threatened by pathogens.
2. Moral vitalism and explanations for infectious
disease
People often posit the existence of supernatural ‘forces’ or ‘spir-
its’ to explain events that do not have a clear biological or
psychological explanation—a tendency that is especially acute
for harmful events [9–11]. We suggest that disease outbreaks
represented such events among pre-germ-theory societies. In
these groups, people needed a theory for predicting, and from
which they could attempt to control, the spread of disease.
A belief in contagious and contaminating evil forces—which
we label ‘moral vitalism’—would have provided a functionally
equivalent framework for prediction and management, identi-
fying both the infection and transmission profile of pathogens.
Buttressing this possibility is the observation that cultures
vary widely in their lay explanations for disease and suffering
[12], including a tendency to explain and respond to disease by
drawing on a belief in moralistic supernatural forces; a ten-
dency that has been observed across Africa, Asia, Europe
and North America ([13,14]; a case in point is the escalation
of witch-hunts in response to the Black Death). Furthermore,
spiritual responses to physical illness and disease remain pop-
ular in modern societies (e.g. faith healing, spiritual healing),
where health complaints are sometimes attributed to the will
of God or the work of the Devil [15,16], thus illustrating their
attractiveness as intuitive explanations.
The concept of moral vitalism [17] draws on previous work
documenting theories of vital forces, energies, power, ‘soul-
stuff’ or spirits in many traditional belief systems [18–21], in
early scientific and psychological theorizing [22,23], in chil-
dren’s understanding of biology [11,24], in adult thinking
about natural and psychological events [9,25] and in reasoning
about interpersonal contagion or transmission [26–29]. A belief
inmoral vitalismhas been associatedwith concerns that people
are vulnerable to possession (infection) by evil forces, and that
these forces are interpersonally contagious (transmission; [17]).
By providing a framework for predicting the spread of
infectious disease, moral vitalism would also have facilitated
(or at least cognitively justified) behavioural strategies
designed to limit infection. We argue that moral vitalistic
beliefs may have contributed to these antipathogen psycho-
logical tendencies in two ways. First, moral vitalism would
have reinforced evolved tendencies to avoid pathogen cues in
the immediate environment [6,8,30]. This is consistent with
evidence showing that endorsement ofmoral vitalism is associ-
ated with heightened disgust sensitivity and avoidance
of indirect contact with suspicious strangers ([17]; see also
[27,28]). Second, moral vitalism would have reinforced the
emergence of conservative ideologies within high pathogen
environments [31–33]. Conservatism has been linked to adher-
ence to culturally evolved norms and rituals which neutralize
local pathogen threats (e.g. food preparation norms; [34]) and
ethnocentrism which encourages behavioural avoidance of
strangers, limiting exposure to novel pathogens for which
one’s immune system resistance is low (e.g. [5,31–33]; although
see [35–37]). This is consistent with prior work showing that
endorsement of moral vitalism is associated with conservative
attitudes, fundamentalist thinking and religiosity [17].
3. The current studies
The above reasoning suggests three key predictions. Our first
and main prediction is that moral vitalistic beliefs should be
especially evident in contexts characterized by higher historical
pathogen prevalence. That is, given their use in limiting the
spread of infection, such beliefs should flourish and become
entrenched under conditions of high pathogen prevalence.
We tested this prediction using both archival data (studies 1
and 2) and our own multi-national survey (study 3). Across
all three studies, we examined the link between belief in evil
forces (study 1—evil eye beliefs, witchcraft; study 2—belief in
the devil; study 3—belief in evil forces) and geographical vari-
ation in historical pathogen prevalence. Our second prediction
is that becausemoral vitalism provides a functional framework
for managing the spread of disease, it should be associated
with antipathogen psychological tendencies linked to the be-
havioural immune system. We tested this prediction in study
3 by examining the relationship between moral vitalism and
conservative attitudes and group-binding moralities. Our
third prediction is that if moral vitalism represents the more
proximal influence of pathogen threat on human cognition
and culture, then it should help to explain the previously
reported relationships between pathogen prevalence and anti-
pathogen psychological tendencies linked to the behavioural
immune system. We explored this prediction in study 3 by
asking if moral vitalism statistically mediated the link between
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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pathogen prevalence and conservative attitudes as well as
group-binding moralities.
4. Study 1: evil eye belief
We began with the standard cross-cultural sample (SCCS).
This includes an index of the existence of the evil eye belief
within various cultural contexts. The evil eye refers to another
person who casts a curse, leading to misfortune or injury,
through a malevolent glare. The SCCS also includes an index
of the extent to which people in a particular culture ascribe
any impairment of health to the existence of witchcraft. The
most common strategy witches are believed to rely on when
causing impairment is the evil eye, highlighting conceptual
convergence between these two concepts of illness causation
[13]. We focused on these two beliefs as they both entail the
idea that evil forces can be contagious and contaminating, ana-
logous to the transfer of pathogens, and in a way that is
structurally similar to a belief in moral vitalism (see [17]; see
also [38,39] for alternative accounts). For instance, a belief in
the evil eye suggests the possibility of interpersonal trans-
mission of evil and the practice of witchcraft explicitly refers
to the channelling of evil spirits, both of which have the
capacity to cause harm. In line with our main prediction, we
examined whether a belief in the evil eye and witchcraft was
more apparent in contexts characterized by higher levels of
historical pathogen prevalence.
(a) Material and methods
(i) Archival data
The SCCS is a representative sample of the world’s known
and well-described cultures, each pinpointed to the smallest
identifiable subgroup of the specific society at the time it
was constructed [40]. The SCCS includes observational data
for 186 distinct cultures spanning a wide range of diverse
societies worldwide (covering preindustrial societies to tech-
nologically advanced agricultural societies) and documented
at a time of maximum cultural independence with the explicit
aim of overcoming the problem of co-influence between
cultures (commonly referred to as Galton’s problem).
Evil eye belief.Thiswas coded for in the SCCSbyRoberts [41]
on a scale from 1 (incontrovertibly absent) to 8 (incontrovertibly
present).
Witchcraft. This explanation attributed illness to the suspected
voluntary or involuntary aggressive action of a member of a
special class of human beings believed to be endowed with a
special power and propensity for evil (1, absence of such a
cause; 2, minor or relatively unimportant cause; 3, an impor-
tant auxiliary cause; 4, predominant cause recognized by the
society; [13]).
Historical pathogen prevalence. An index of historical pathogen
prevalence for the 186 SCCS cultures has been developed by
Cashdan [42]. A combined index uses the mean of z-scores for
the historical prevalence of 10 pathogens (malaria, dengue,
filariae, typhus, trypanosomes, leishmanias, schistosomes and
plague, leprosy and spirochetes) derived from historical
sources, chiefly global maps published in the mid-twentieth
century.
Control variables. We included a number of control variables
coded in the SCCS which allowed us to rule out the possibility
that our observed relationship was an artefact of religious
belief, the extent of internal or external conflict, frequency of
adverse events such as famine, resource uncertainty or wealth
inequality. We also controlled for explanations for health
impairment, other than witchcraft, as coded by Murdock [13].
See the electronic supplementary material for a full discussion
of control variables.
(b) Results
Zero-order correlations indicate that the evil eye belief is
significantly and positively correlated with historical patho-
gen prevalence, r186 = 0.24, p = 0.001, as is a reliance on
witchcraft as an explanation for illness, r131 = 0.57, p < 0.001
(see the electronic supplementary material, table S1 for all
correlations including control variables). Given extensive
missing data across all control variables, to maintain power,
we analysed each separately to maintain a reasonable
sample size. Multiple regression analyses revealed the
relationship between historical pathogen prevalence and
evil eye beliefs (all ps < 0.030) and witchcraft remained signifi-
cant (all ps < 0.038) in all cases (see the electronic
supplementary material, tables S2 and S3 for full reporting).
5. Study 2: belief in the devil
The findings from the SCCS dataset revealed that in contexts
where historical pathogen prevalence was high, so too was
the tendency for these cultures to endorse a belief in the exist-
ence of contagious and contaminating evil forces which can
cause illness. Next, we examined data from the World
Values Survey (WVS) in which respondents were asked
whether they believed in the devil (0, no; 1, yes; a binary out-
come variable which be understood as a proportion). We
used Wave 3 survey data because more cross-national data
were available on this question compared to all other
waves. A belief in the Devil entails the existence of a specific
evil force in the world and is therefore relevant to moral vit-
alism. We, therefore, predicted this belief would be higher in
countries which have historically higher levels of pathogens.
(a) Material and methods
(i) Archival data
We used survey data from Wave 3 (conducted from 1995 to
1998) of the WVS in which 60 454 respondents (Mage = 40.89,
s.d. = 15.91, 51.6% female) from 50 countries were asked
whether they believed in the devil (0, no; 1, yes). Four countries
had missing data on the country-level predictors, therefore,
leaving a maximum sample size of 58 076 at level 1 and 46 at
level 2 for the multilevel analyses.
(ii) Socio-demographic covariates
The following socio-demographic variables were included as
individual-level covariates: age, gender (recoded: 0, male; 1,
female), level of education (recoded: 1, lower; 2, middle; 3,
upper), social class (recoded: 1, lower class; 5, upper class),
religiosity (recoded: 1, religion not at all important in life; 4, reli-
gion very important in life), political orientation (1, left; 10, right)
and subjective health (1, very poor; 5, very good).
(iii) Country-level variables
Historical pathogen prevalence. Historical pathogen prevalence
estimates were obtained from Murray & Schaller [4] who
compiled an index incorporating nine distinct diseases
(leishmanias, schistosomes, trypanosomes, leprosy, malaria,
typhus, filariae, dengue and tuberculosis) derived from
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
Proc.R.Soc.B
286:20191576
3
epidemiological atlases mapping the prevalence of each
disease in each region.
(iv) Country-level control variables
Human development index. We argue that belief in evil forces
may be relied on when more scientific explanations are not
available, suggesting that the level of development may be
important. Therefore, we obtained country scores on the
human development index (HDI; http://hdr.undp.org/en/
countries) which is composed of national income, education
and life expectancy (expressed as a value between 0 and 1).
We averaged the country scores from 1990 to 2000 so that
the HDI data correspond to the time when the WVS data
were gathered.1,2
Corruption. We reasoned that people might rely on a belief in
evil forces to explain unfair and unethical behaviour.
If so, such beliefs should be especially common in contexts
wherein corruption is high. To this end, we drew on the
Corruption Perception Index [44] ranging from 0 (highly
corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
Democracy. We argue that believing in evil forces provides a
sense of prediction and control, something that might also
be relevant in non-democratic contexts wherein citizens feel
they have little control. To test this, we used an index of
democracy, drawing on data from The Economist Intelligence
Unit’s Democracy Index [45]. This is a single score based on
five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties;
the functioning of government; political participation; and
political culture.
Peace. Believing in evil forces might also be relied on to explain
contexts characterized by intergroup conflict. As such,we drew
on a measure of a country’s peacefulness, using data from the
Global Peace Index (GPI) Report from 2013 [46]. The index
assesses the level of safety and security in society, the extent
of domestic and international conflict and the degree ofmilitar-
ization. The index was recoded so that higher scores reflect
more peacefulness.
(v) Analytic strategy
We used multilevel modelling (MLM) which allowed us to
examine the effect of pathogen prevalence on belief in the
devil while controlling for relevant covariates at both the indi-
vidual and country-level. Given that the criterion variable is
binary, we analysed the datawith multilevel logistic regression
specifying a Bernoulli distribution and restricted penalized
quasi-likelihood estimation in HLM 7 [47]. We used grand-
mean centring for all individual- and country-level predictors
which is most appropriate when the focus of interest is on
examining the predictive power of a level 2 variable while
controlling for level 1 covariates [48].
(b) Results
Correlating pathogen prevalence with the proportion of
individuals believing in the devil in each country shows that
there is a significant association between the two variables,
r46 = 0.52, p < 0.001 (see also the electronic supplementary
material, figure S1). Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel
logistic regression analyses predicting belief in the devil. Ana-
lysing a random-interceptmodelwith no explanatory variables
(model 0) yielded an intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of
0.37meaning that 37%of the total variance in the criterion vari-
able is owing to differences between countries. In model 1, we
entered all individual-level variables as fixed effects and found
that age, gender, religiosity, conservative political orientation,
education, social class and subjective health were significant
predictors of belief in the devil.
We then tested the country-level predictors and found
that pathogen prevalence (model 2) was a significant
predictor of belief in the devil when controlling for socio-
demographics. In model 3, we accounted for the possibility
that individual-level associations vary across countries by
including random slopes into the model and found that it
did not affect the predictive power of pathogen prevalence,
B = 0.553, odds ratio = 1.738, p = 0.011 (table 1). We proceeded
controlling for each country-level covariate at once because of
the relatively small country-level sample size (when all
country-level predictors were entered simultaneously, none
were significant predictors; see the electronic supplementary
material, table S4, model 6). The effect of historical pathogen
prevalence on belief in the devil remained significant when
controlling for the Corruption Index (p = 0.022) and the
Democracy Index ( p = 0.012) but became marginal when con-
trolling for the Peace Index ( p = 0.086) and the HDI ( p =
0.094).3 None of the country-level controls were themselves
significant predictors: Corruption Index ( p = 0.578), Democ-
racy Index ( p = 0.597), Peace Index ( p = 0.707) and HDI
( p = 0.778). The full results are reported in the electronic
supplementary material, table S4.
6. Study 3: moral vitalism
As a direct test of our theory, we conducted a large multi-
national survey incorporating a measure of moral vitalism
(see [17]), a construct that specifically assesses belief in the exist-
ence of spiritual forces of good and evil (e.g. ‘There are
underlying forces of good and evil in this world’). As noted
above, a belief in moral vitalism has been associated with con-
cerns that people are vulnerable to possession by evil forces and
that these forces are interpersonally contagious [17]. A belief in
moral vitalism is therefore sensitive to the avenues through
which pathogens are known to cause harm to humans—
through infection and interpersonal transmission—and offers
a functionally equivalent theory of pathogens effects on
human health to that provided by modern-day germ theories.
In this study,we also sought to provide additional evidence
for our claim that moral vitalistic beliefs function to manage
the spread of infection. As noted, prior work has revealed
that conservative attitudes and group-binding moralities
emerged within high pathogen environments. In line with
our second prediction, we examined associations between
moral vitalistic beliefs and these antipathogen psychological
tendencies, basing our prediction on previous work showing
a relationship between moral vitalism and conservative
attitudes, fundamentalist thinking and religiosity [17].
Our reasoning also suggests that moral vitalism may
represent a more proximal influence of pathogen threat on
human cognition and culture and therefore should help to
explain the previously reported relationships between pathogen
prevalence and these psychological tendencies linked to the be-
havioural immune system. In line with this prediction, we
explored whether moral vitalism statistically mediated any
relationship between historical pathogen prevalence and
conservative values and a group-binding morality.
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(a) Material and methods
(i) Participants and procedure
A total of 3202 university students residing in 28 countries
(North and South America, Europe, Asia and Australasia)
participated in this study for course credit. Participants
were only included in the analyses if they were nationals
from the respective countries or if they had lived in the
country for more than 10 years, leaving an effective sample
size of 3131. The average age of the total sample was 22.61
years (s.d. = 6.27) and 64.4% of all participants were female.
An overview of sample characteristics for each country is pre-
sented in the electronic supplementary material, table S6.
Respondents who took part in the study either received
course credits or reimbursement. All samples were collected
in line with relevant ethical protocols and informed consent
procedures for each country.
(ii) Measures
Participants responded to a larger questionnaire and only the
measures relevant for the present study are described here.
The questionnaire was developed in English and established
translations of scales were used whenever possible. All other
measures were translated into the respective language of the
country by bilinguals and the accuracy of the translation was
verified through back-translations or a committee approach.
(iii) Individual-level variables
Moral vitalism. Bastian et al.’s [17] measure of moral vitalism
served as our dependent variable. It features five items asses-
sing the belief in real, agentic forces of good and evil (e.g.
‘There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world’,
‘Good and evil are aspects of the natural world’) on a 6-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly
agree). Cronbach’s αs based on standardized items were
satisfactory across countries (M = 0.75, range: 0.63–0.85). Tests
of approximate measurement invariance across countries (see
[50]) supported only a weaker form of measurement invariance
(partialmetric invariance). However, dropping one of the items
yielded acceptable fit indices for a partial scalar model (strong
form of measurement invariance; see [50]). Re-running the
main model with the four-item measure yielded virtually
the same results as for the five-item measure (except for the
non-significant main effect of gender and the non-significant
random slope of religiosity with the four-item measure, see
the electronic supplementary material, table S7).
Antipathogen psychological tendencies. We adopted two
measures designed to tap antipathogen psychological ten-
dencies, each of which has been linked to historical pathogen
prevalence in past work (e.g. [5,33]). Participants completed
14moral relevance items developed byGraham et al. [51] asses-
sing the three moral binding foundations: ingroup/loyalty,
authority/respect and purity/sanctity (1, never relevant, to 6,
always relevant). Cronbach’s αs based on standardized items
were satisfactory across countries (M = 0.84, range: 0.76–0.91).
We used the Short Schwartz’s Value Survey to assess individ-
uals’ endorsement of conservative values (e.g. honouring
elders). We employed Lindeman & Verkasalo’s [52] equation
to obtain individuals’ scores on the main value dimension
conservation versus openness-to-change.
(iv) Control variables
Given that moral vitalism is associated with religion and pol-
itical conservatism (see [17]) and that both of these variables
have been linked to historical pathogen prevalence (e.g. [1]),
we sought to control for whether people indicated following
a religion and their political orientation.
Religion. Participants were asked whether they followed a
religion (0, no and 1, yes).
Political orientation. Participants completed a measure of politi-
cal orientation towards social issues (‘Please indicate your
political beliefs from left/liberal to right/conservative on
social issues; e.g. immigration, homosexual marriage,
abortion’) (1, left/liberal; 7, right/conservative) and economic
issues (‘Please indicate your political beliefs from left/liberal to
right/conservative on economic issues; e.g. social welfare, gov-
ernment spending, tax cuts’) (1 = left/liberal; 7, right/
conservative). Political orientation itemswere significantly cor-
related in all countries, except in China (r = 0.06, p = 0.475) and
so were kept separate in the analyses.
(v) Country-level variables
Historical pathogen prevalence. We drew on the same existing
data for historical pathogen prevalence estimates from
Murray & Schaller [4] as in study 2 above.
Control variables. The same variables as in study 2 were used
to control for the socio-political and economic context of a
country: the HDI [53], the Corruption Perception Index [44],
the Democracy Index [45] and the GPI [46].
(vi) Analytic strategy
We employed MLM analysis as in study 2 to test the link
between pathogen prevalence and moral vitalism. This time,
however, we used linear multilevel regression (with restricted
maximum-likelihood estimation) in HLM 7 [47], because the
dependent variable was continuous. We grand-mean centred
all individual- and country-level predictors for the same
reasons as the ones mentioned in study 2.
To test the mediation hypotheses, we employed a 2-1-1
multilevel mediation model within the structural equation
paradigm (MSEM) in MPLUS 7 [54]. This means that the
independent variable (Xj) is assessed at level 2, both the
mediator (Mij) and the dependent variables are measured at
level 1 (Yij). In other words, we expected that historical disease
prevalence as a level 2 antecedent influences the level 1
mediator (moral vitalism) which then affects the level 1 out-
come variables (conservative values or moral binding
foundations). See the electronic supplementary material for a
longer discussion of the statistical approach employed.
(b) Results
Descriptive country-level statistics of all variables and sample
characteristics are shown in the electronic supplementary
material, table S6. Pathogen prevalence correlated with moral
vitalism at r27 = 0.50, p = 0.007, therefore, sharing 24.70% of
its variance. Figure 1 illustrates the link between pathogen
prevalence and moral vitalism across all 28 countries.
Table 2 shows the results of the multilevel regression
analyses explaining beliefs in moral vitalism. Analysing a
random-interceptmodel with no explanatory variables yielded
an ICC of 0.24 (model 0). Inmodel 1, we entered all individual-
level variables as fixed effects and found that gender, religion
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and conservative political orientation were significant predic-
tors of moral vitalism. We then tested pathogen prevalence
(model 2) as a country-level predictor and confirmed that it
was a significant predictor of moral vitalism when controlling
for socio-demographics. This model explained 34.87% of the
between-country variance and 7.03% of the within-country
variance. We accounted again for the possibility that individ-
ual-level associations vary across countries by including
random slopes into the model, which did not affect the pre-
dictive power of pathogen prevalence, B = 0.379, s.e. = 0.111,
p = 0.002 (table 2, model 3). Similar to study 2, we proceeded
by controlling for each country-level covariate at once,
although in this case when all country-level predictors were
entered simultaneously pathogen prevalence remained signifi-
cant, and the strongest predictor (see the electronic
supplementary material, table S5, model 5). Pathogen preva-
lence remained a significant predictor of moral vitalism
controlling for the Corruption Index (p = 0.003) and the Peace
Index ( p = 0.003), but became a marginal predictor when
controlling for the Democracy Index ( p = 0.057) and the HDI
( p = 0.062). None of the country-level controls were themselves
significant predictors of moral vitalism: Corruption Index ( p =
0.387), Democracy Index ( p = 0.164), Peace Index (p = 0.728)
and HDI (p = 0.369). The full results are reported in the
electronic supplementary material, table S5.
Next, we proceeded with two separate mediation analyses to
assess whether moral vitalism mediates the link between patho-
gen prevalence and (i) conservative values and (ii) the moral
binding foundations. We conducted the analyses in three steps
([55]; see the electronic supplementary material, figure S2). Step
1 revealed that respondents were more conservative in their
values if they resided in countries with higher patho-
gen prevalence than in countries with less prevalence (B= 0.197,
p< 0.05).However,pathogenprevalencedidnot significantlypre-
dict the moral binding foundation in our sample (B= 0.114, p>
0.05). Because mediation analyses do not require a significant
association between the independent and dependent variables
[56], we proceeded with the mediation analyses for the moral
binding foundation as well. Step 2 confirmed again that higher
pathogenprevalence significantly predictedbeliefs inmoral vital-
ism (B= 0.449, p< 0.01). Step 3 showed that a belief in moral
vitalism was associated with greater conservatism (B= 0.579,
p< 0.001), and a greater endorsement of the moral binding
foundation (B= 0.421, p< 0.01). Including moral vitalism as a
mediator in each model diminished the link between pathogen
prevalence and conservatism (B= 0.074, p< 0.05) as well as the
moral binding foundation (B=−0.075, p< 0.01). The test of
the indirect effect corroborated that the association between
pathogen prevalence and the two criterion variables decreased
significantly after taking into account moral vitalism
(indirect effectconservatism = 0.259, s.e. = 0.101, p= 0.010; indirect
effectbinding foundation = 0.189, s.e. = 0.088, p= 0.031).
In short, the findings reveal a relatively robust association
between pathogen prevalence and moral vitalism. Moreover,
moral vitalism statistically mediated previously established
links between pathogen prevalence and psychological ten-
dencies associated with pathogen avoidance. The latter
finding provides additional support for our argument that
moral vitalistic beliefs help diminish the spread of infection.
7. Discussion
Our analysis of archival and contemporary data offers conver-
ging support for the notion that pathogen prevalence may
reinforce moral vitalistic beliefs. Two archival studies revealed
that in contexts defined by higher historical pathogen preva-
lence, people were more likely to believe in the devil, the
malevolent power of the evil eye and in witches who channel
evil. This archival evidence was bolstered by a new multi-
national study in which participants completed a recently
developed measure of belief in moral vitalism. Across all
three studies, we uncovered consistent evidence that historical
pathogen prevalence is related to an increased tendency to
believe that there are forces of evil at work in the world.
We argue that moral vitalistic beliefs are likely to be
functional. By providing an explanatory framework that func-
tionally mapped the infection and transmission profile of
pathogens, a belief in contagious and agentic spiritual forces
of evil allowed for more effective prediction and response to
the threat of disease. As reported by Bastian et al. [17], moral
vitalism is associated with concerns over contagion and
contamination and this explanatory framework, therefore, dis-
courages contact with those who may be possessed by the
forces of evil. Furthermore, the association between moral vit-
alism and both political conservatism and ingroup preference
suggests that it may have reinforced antipathogen behavioural
tendencies reported elsewhere in the literature. In this way,
moral vitalistic beliefs may represent a psychological mechan-
ism that conferred an adaptive advantagewithin environments
characterized by a high pathogen load.
We argue that our lay explanatory account contributes to
the literature in severalways. First, it articulates a psychological
theorywhichmay have encouraged people to enact behaviour-
al strategies that functioned to manage the infection threat of
pathogens. A theory of evil forces effectively modelled the
interpersonal transmission of pathogens, and therefore motiv-
ated other antipathogen psychological tendencies. Second, it
provides a parsimonious account in which a specific belief
system was selected to allow for the emergence of a suite of
psychological tendencies (such as conservative ideologies)
which limited pathogen transmission. Third, it generates a
range of novel hypotheses. Prior work has assumed detection
mechanisms capable of identifying pathogen threats (e.g. [8]),
yet effective threat detection in humans is improved in the pres-
ence of a theory (lay or scientific) on which to base prediction
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and response. Our work suggests that moral vitalism provided
a pre-germ-theory explanation that assisted in guiding
response to pathogen threat.
Although a reliance on moral vitalism as an explanation
for illness would have been especially apparent when scien-
tific explanations were unavailable, such thinking remains
evident in many modern societies, wherein health complaints
are sometimes attributed to the will of God or the work of the
devil [15,16] and spiritual remedies persist (e.g. faith healing,
spiritual healing, Reiki). Just as religion has remained attrac-
tive in view of scientific advances in evolutionary theory, we
suggest a reliance on evil to explain illness has remained
attractive owing to its capacity to moralize illness (i.e. explain
why people become ill) compared to biological models that
primarily explain how (i.e. via transmission and infection).
Furthermore, once a belief is embedded, it tends to diffuse
across generations in a culture—a process referred to as cul-
tural transmission (e.g. [57])—thus providing an additional
explanation for the persistence of moral vitalistic beliefs.
A strength of the current studies is that they draw on eco-
logical measures of naturalistic contexts, yet this also limits
the capacity to draw causal inferences or to rule out third vari-
ables and alternative explanations. Nonetheless, we see a good
reason to have confidence in our analyses. First, the nature of
our key variables strongly suggests a causal picture; it is unli-
kely that belief in evil forces increased pathogen load. Second,
reverse mediation models provide less statistical evidence for
antipathogen psychological tendencies as predicting moral vit-
alism (see the electronic supplementary material for full
discussion and analysis). Third, we controlled for a wide
range of potential third variables in our analyses. Fourth,
other potential explanations suggest only a palliative function:
disease outbreaks could heighten death anxiety, reduce psycho-
logical control or represent an attributional challenge making
morality-based afterlife beliefs and a belief in all powerful
and moralizing Gods more attractive (e.g. [58,59]). Yet, these
explanations do not model the potential spread of pathogens
in the same way that a belief in moral vitalism does. It is the
more specific belief in contagious and contaminating evil
forces that provides a functionally equivalent framework for
predicting and therefore controlling the spread of disease (see
the electronic supplemental material for additional points of
discussion).
In conclusion, our findings represent a novel perspective on
the manner in which pathogens may shape human cognition.
While previous attempts have focused on how this ecological
variable shapes broad beliefs and intergroup behaviour in
ways that limit the spread of pathogens,we provide an analysis
of how a pre-germ-theory lay explanation for the disease
would have improved predictability and control of disease out-
breaks. In doing so, we also provide insight into how
explanations for illness may have shaped or reinforced specific
beliefs which have broader social implications.
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Endnotes
1We used an HDI for Taiwan that had been calculated by its govern-
ment in 2011 [43].
2The earliest HDI data available for Nigeria were from 2003 and for
Macedonia from 2000.
3This result is based on robust standard errors. When considering
non-robust standard errors, pathogen prevalence becomes a non-
significant predictor ( p = 0.128). We used non-robust standard
errors for all analyses because a sample size of at least 100 at level 2
is needed for robust standard errors to be accurate. At the same
time, robust standard errors would be more adequate to consider
for the non-normally distributed data [49]. Hence, the results con-
cerning the HDI as a covariate are somewhat inconclusive which
may also be because of multicollinearity with pathogen prevalence
(r45=−0.682, p < 0.001).
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